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PLATFORM WORKERS AND COLLECTIVE
LABOUR ACTION IN THE MODERN ECONOMY
Bethany Hastie*
Introduction
Work in the digital platform economy, such as for Uber, Lyft, Foodora, Door Dash,
and other similar services, has given rise to substantial legal and scholarly attention in
recent years. Like many other forms of work and employment, platform workers are
often characterized as precarious. These workers face significant obstacles, both
formal and practical, in accessing legal rights and protections related to their work.
Scholars in general, and legal scholars in particular, have largely been preoccupied
with the question of status or taxonomy for platform workers to date, unpacking and
debating the question of whether platform workers are properly characterized as
employees or independent contractors. While the question of taxonomy is important,
as will be discussed in this article, it has largely deflected attention away from the
multitude of strategies and avenues that platform workers can, and do, use to advance
their labour interests regardless of their employment status. The current focus on
taxonomy reveals a deeper concern for the challenges facing gig workers as workers,
regardless of the status ascribed to them, and of the possibilities for innovative
solutions to improve advance their interests beyond or outside of existing legislative
regimes. While a variety of legislative and policy responses to regulating the platform
economy have been explored,1 this article examines how platform workers are
*
Assistant Professor, Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia. This research was
supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. I wish to thank Mitchell
Horkoff for his research assistance on this article, as well as the editorial board of the University of New
Brunswick Law Journal, and the anonymous reviewers for this article, for their helpful feedback and
guidance.
1

For a broader discussion of various regulatory responses that fall both within and outside of the debate on
classification, see e.g. Maria Mexi, “Social Dialogue and the Governance of the Digital Platform Economy:
Understanding Challenges, Shaping Opportunities”, (Background paper for the ILO-AICESIS-CES
Romania International Conference, 10-11 October 2019) at 7, online (pdf): International Labour
Organization
<www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/--dialogue/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_723431.pdf>, citing also: Molly Cohen & Arun
Sundararajan, “Self-Regulation and Innovation in the Peer-to-Peer Sharing Economy” (2015) 82 U Chicago
L Rev Online 116; MaryAnne M Gobble, “Regulating Innovation in the New Economy” (2015) 58:2
Research-Technology Management 62; Seth D Harris & Alan B Krueger, “A Proposal for Modernizing
Labor Laws for Twenty-First-Century Work: The ‘Independent Worker’” (December 2015), online (pdf):
The
Hamilton
Project
<www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_first_century_work_krueger
_harris.pdf>; Kristin Jesnes, “Employment Models of Platform Companies in Norway: A Distinctive
Approach?” (2019) 9:S6 Nordic J Working Life Studies 53; Christopher Koopman, Matthew Mitchell &
Adam Thierer, “The Sharing Economy and Consumer Protection Regulation: The Case for Policy Change”
(2015) 8:2 J Bus Entrepreneurship & L 529; Stephen R Miller, “First Principles for Regulating the Sharing
Economy” (2016) 53:1 Harv J on Legis 147; Sofia Ranchordas, “Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating
Innovation in the Sharing Economy” (2015) 16:1 Minn J L Sci & Tech 413; Andrew Stewart & Jim Stanford,
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engaging in various forms of collective labour action to directly advance their needs
and interests outside of, or in furtherance of, formal regulation and response by
government and business actors.
This article surveys existing efforts by platform workers to collectively
organize and advance their labour interests, with a view to improving their working
rights and conditions. After reviewing the status of platform workers, the challenges
and contours of their work, and the needs and interests that may be served through
collective labour action in Section I, this article describes and comments on identified
forms of collective labour action undertaken by platform workers across a number of
jurisdictions in Section II. As this article discusses, collective labour action, in its many
modalities, both formal and informal, creates a context in which the traditional legal
debates regarding the status of the worker become less important, focusing instead on
the actual needs, interests, rights and conditions of work at issue. Collective labour
action, as a tool for improving workplace rights and conditions, as well as a political
strategy, also creates greater space for the participation and voice of workers. The rich
and diverse forms of collective labour action undertaken by platform workers provide
both illustrations and lessons that can be drawn for workers in other precarious
industries and jobs, and more broadly in considering the future of labour law in a
modern economy increasingly characterized by work outside of traditional direct
employment, a discussion taken up in Section III. This article thus sets a descriptive
foundation for further dialogue on the future of labour law in the modern economy,
both for platform workers and the many other, and growing, populations of workers
falling outside of traditional labour and employment protections.
I. Mapping the Landscape of Platform Work
Platform work has given rise to a substantial body of literature, litigation, and
legislation, concerned with classifying platform workers for the purposes of labour
and employment law. This debate has largely focused on determining whether workers
are ‘employees’, and thus entitled to existing rights and protections afforded in
domestic labour and employment law, or ‘independent contractors’ who fall outside
the purview of legal regulation of employment.2 The implications of this question of
status are clear; workers who are employees have the benefit of access to rights, such
as minimum wage, and protections, such as in relation to health and safety, and against
unjust dismissal. Workers who are not employees, but independent contractors,
“Regulating Work in the Gig Economy: What Are the Options?” (2017) 28:3 Economic & Labour Relations
Rev 420.
2

See e.g. Jeremias Prassl & Martin Risak, “Uber, Taskrabbit, & Co.: Platforms as Employers? Rethinking
the Legal Analysis of Crowdwork” (2016) 37:3 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 619; Guy Davidov, “The Status of
Uber Drivers: A Purposive Approach” (2017) 6:1/2 Spanish Labour L & Employment Relations J 6; Robert
Sprague, “Worker (Mis)Classification in the Sharing Economy: Trying to Fit Square Pegs into Round
Holes” (2015) 31:1 ABA J Labor & Employment L 53; Abi Adams, Judith Freedman & Jeremias Prassl,
“Rethinking Legal Taxonomies for the Gig Economy” (2018) 34:3 Oxford Rev Economic Policy 475; Emily
C Atmore, “Killing the Goose That Laid the Golden Egg: Outdated Employment Laws Are Destroying the
Gig Economy” (2017) 102:2 Minn L Rev 887.
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receive no rights or protections under employment law and are thus required to
negotiate their working conditions directly with their ‘clients’. The status question also
relates directly to efforts to unionize amongst platform workers.
Most jurisdictions, including Canada, historically developed legal tests to
determine whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor. These tests
often look to a variety of factors with a view to ascertaining the extent of control
exerted over the worker and their working conditions. Factors typically include: who
owns the tools of the trade; whether the worker has a uniform; whether the worker can
set their own schedule or hours of work; and, others.3 Platform work poses obvious
challenges in attempting to use such factors as a basis for categorization. While
platform workers typically “own the tools of the trade” (their vehicles or bicycles),4
the extent of control that the companies may exert over working conditions, hours,
future work prospects, and wages, is significant.5 As such, a nuanced application of
historical employment tests under law produces a less-than-clear, and contestable,
result for platform workers.
Recent recognition of the growing number of workers in various industries
who are neither clearly employees nor independent contractors has given way to new
categories of workers, such as “dependent contractor”, in some jurisdictions. For
example, Ontario recognizes the category of “dependent contractor”, which it defines
as: “non-employment work relationships that exhibit a certain minimum economic
3

In Canada, the leading authority is 671122 Ontario Ltd v Sagaz Industries Canada Inc, 2001 SCC 59,
which summarizes the various tests and criteria historically adopted in Canada at paras 35–47. In California,
the recent decision in Dynamex Operations West, Inc v Superior Court of Los Angeles, 4 Cal (5th)
903 (2018) rejected the historical Borello test used to determine whether workers were employees or
independent contractors, which had, similar to the Canadian approach, emphasized the extent of control
over working conditions, as well as other factors such as such as ownership of equipment, opportunity for
profit and loss, and the belief of the parties. The California Supreme Court in Dynamex adopted a new “ABC
test” that begins from a rebuttable presumption that the worker is an employee.
4

But see Canadian Union of Postal Workers v Foodora Inc dba Foodora (2020), CanLII 16750 at paras
92–99, 2020 CLLC 220-032 (OLRB) [Foodora], which characterizes the app (technology) as the essential
tool of the trade, and which is owned and maintained by the enterprise.
5
A number of jurisdictions are currently considering, or have already made judicial pronouncements, on
this question. See Jeremias Prassl, Humans as a Service: The Promise and Perils of Work in the Gig
Economy (London, UK: Oxford University Press, 2018) at 11; “Employment status of platform workers
(national courts decisions overview—Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France,
Germany, Italy, Nederland, Panama, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States & Uruguay)” (8
December 2018), online (blog): Una Mirada Crítica a Las Relaciones Laborales
<ignasibeltran.com/2018/12/09/employment-status-of-platform-workers-national-courts-decisionsoverview-australia-brazil-chile-france-italy-united-kingdom-united-states-spain/> cited in Mexi, supra note
1 at 6, n 4; Hilary Osborne, “Uber Loses Right to Classify UK Drivers as Self-Employed”, The Guardian
(28 October 2016), online: <www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/28/uber-uk-tribunal-selfemployed-status>. Conversely, relevant bodies in both US and Australia have declared Uber drivers to be
independent contractors; see Daniel Wiessner, “Uber drivers are contractors, not employees, U.S. labor
agency says”, Reuters (14 May 2019), online: <www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-contractors/uber-driversare-contractors-not-employees-us-labor-agency-says-idUSKCN1SK2FY>; Paul Karp, “Uber drivers are
not employees, Fair Work Ombudsman rules”, The Guardian (7 June 2019), online:
<www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jun/07/uber-drivers-are-not-employees-fair-work-ombudsmanrules>.
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dependency, which may be demonstrated by complete or near-complete exclusivity.”6
Recently, the Ontario Labour Board ruled that Foodora workers are dependent
contractors, a category which, under the Ontario Labour Relations Act, extends with
it a right to form a union and collectively bargain with the enterprise.7 These
intermediary categories aim to reflect new forms of working relationships that are
characterized by degrees of dependence and control, and yet over which workers also
exercise control and autonomy. Despite these new categories, where they exist, issues
remain in classifying platform workers. Overall, the question of employment status
does not resolve the issues facing platform workers in relation to their labour rights
and interests.
As with many other forms of precarious work, workers in the platform
economy are said to face varying levels of exploitation associated with their work.
Concerns regarding wages, health and safety, and access to legal remedies are
commonly documented.8 Scholars engaged in the classification debate largely see the
solution to exploitation as expanding current legal definitions of employment to
encompass platform workers. Some scholars have focused attention on the underlying
normative criteria that employment tests might focus more substantially on, such as
subordination,9 while other approaches have argued for the creation of intermediary
categories between employee and independent contractor.10 Yet others have argued
for a radical shift away from classification under employment law, advocating for the
extension of a set of core rights and protections for all forms and modes of work.11
The debate about status has likely been a focal point in existing scholarship
precisely because of its assumed consequences in extending labour rights, as
mentioned above. If platform workers are employees, they are subsumed under

6

McKee v Reid’s Heritage Homes Ltd, 2009 ONCA 916 at para 30.

7

Foodora, supra note 4 at paras 77–79.

8

See e.g. Global Commission on the Future of Work, Work for a Brighter Future, ILO, (2019) at 44, cited
in Mexi, supra note 1 at 1. See also Miriam A Cherry, “Beyond Misclassification: The Digital
Transformation of Work” (2016) 37:3 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 577 [Cherry, “Digital Transformation”];
Miriam A Cherry, “People Analytics and Invisible Labor” (2016) 61:1 Saint Louis ULJ 1, cited in Mexi,
supra note 1 at 9.
9
See e.g. Emmanuel Dockès, “New trade union strategies for new forms of employment” (2019) 10:3
European Labour LJ 219 at 221.
10
See e.g. Seth Harris & Alan Krueger, “A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for Twenty-First Century
Work: The ‘Independent Worker’” (December 2015), online (pdf): The Hamilton Project
<www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_first_century_work_krueger
_harris.pdf >; George A Green, “Employment Law and the Emerging Notion of The Dependent Contractor”,
Mondaq (14 November 2018), online: <www.mondaq.com/canada/employee-rights-labourrelations/754750/employment-law-and-the-emerging-notion-of-the-dependent-contractor>.
11

Hugh Collins, “A Missed Opportunity of a Unified Test for Employment Status” (31 July 2018), online
(blog): UK Labour Law <uklabourlawblog.com/2018/07/31/a-missed-opportunity-of-a-unified-test-foremployment-status-hugh-collins/>; Cherry, “Digital Transformation”, supra note 8; Eva Grosheide & Mark
Barenberg, “Minimum Fees for the Self-Employed: A European Response to the ‘Uber-ized' Economy?”
(2016) 22:2 Colum J Eur L 193.
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existing labour and employment legislation; if not, they fall wholly outside of it.12 Yet,
regardless of their legal status, platform workers suffer from a lack of clear access to
legal rights and protections, as well as from isolation, which may work independently
and in concert to facilitate circumstances in which workers’ labour is exploited. The
focus on status or taxonomy neglects to account for the difficulties in accessing rights
in practice, even where they are extended on paper.
This evidences an underlying core concern about the material working
conditions of platform workers, regardless of their legally defined status.13 Indeed, the
precariousness of working conditions for platform workers is increasingly
documented, as are some of the negative consequences that can be associated with
such work. While the debate concerning status has obvious merit and urgency, it has,
in some way, deflected attention from a deeper discussion of the labour needs and
interests of workers that might be served through alternative forms of collective labour
action.
Many of the features of platform work are simply a new instantiation of
enduring labour precariousness: the casual or on-call nature of the working hours,
minimal wages, lack of clear safety protections, and others.14 These reflect a general
trend associated with neoliberalism away from standard employment, characterized by
full-time permanent work, towards labour fragmentation and piece-work, facilitated
through short-term contracts.15 This shift in the construction of labour markets is
evidenced by the shedding of legal liability for labour and employment laws by
enterprises, the transfer of risk from employer to worker, and often, consequential

12
Though workers may still be covered by, for example, occupational health and safety regulations, antidiscrimination law, and other related areas of law that regulate work and workplaces.
13
Although status may be significant in determining, for example, formal access to unionization under
domestic laws. See e.g. Mexi, supra note 1 at 6: “The right to collective bargaining for self-employed
workers is the object of legal discussion, as it is often considered in breach of competition law by national
antitrust authorities, given that this is considered "price fixing'' harming consumer welfare”, citing also
Antonio Aloisi, “Negotiating the Digital Transformation of Work: Non-Standard Workers’ Voice,
Collective Rights and Mobilisation Practices in the Platform Economy” (2019) European University
Institute MWP Working Paper No 2019/03; Hannah Johnston & Christopher Land-Kazlauskas, “Organizing
On-Demand: Representation, Voice, and Collective Bargaining in the Gig Economy” (2019) International
Labour Organization Working Paper Conditions of Work and Employment Series No 94.
14

See Stewart & Stanford, supra note 1 at 428–30; Mexi, supra note 1 at 1. Similar issues are noted for a
growing number of workers falling outside of traditional direct-employment relationships; See Judy Fudge,
Eric Tucker & Leah Vosko, “Employee or Independent Contractor? Charting the Legal Significance of the
Distinction in Canada” (2003) 10 CLELJ 193; Guy Davidov, “The Three Axes of Employment
Relationships: A Characterization of Workers in Need of Protection” (2002) 52:4 UTLJ 357 [Davidov,
“Characterization of Workers”]; Bethany Hastie, “Human Rights and Precarious Workplaces: A Comment
on British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal v Schrenk” (2019) 52:1 UBC L Rev 169 [Hastie, “Precarious
Workplaces”].

15
Austin Zwick, “Welcome to the Gig Economy: Neoliberal Industrial Relations in the Case of Uber” (2018)
83:4 GeoJournal 679. See also Jim Stanford, “The Resurgence of Gig Work: Historical and Theoretical
Perspectives” (2017) 28:3 Economic & Labour Relations Rev 382.
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economic benefits passed onto the consumer.16 These are each hallmarks of platform
work, though they are not unique to this kind of work.
Yet, there are features of platform work—or, at least, its representation—that
are distinct in understanding the labour issues surrounding platform work, and which,
in turn, produce distinct consequences for platform workers. The emphasis placed on
technology—both in affirming and disruptive discourses about platform work—is of
particular significance. Specifically, the role of the intermediary platform (or
‘employer’) has been especially obfuscated. This obfuscation is an essential
component to the financial success of the platform economy and, relatedly, to the
illusion of its operation outside of the bounds of labour law.17 The technological core
of platform work is presented as merely a passive instrument through which workers
can connect directly with their clients, or purchasers of goods.18 As a result, the
technological core of platform work operates in a distinct way to obscure the very
existence of the work as regulated labour, to the benefit of the enterprise (or
‘employer’) and, arguably, consumer.
As existing scholarship has demonstrated, technology in this arena further
functions to solidify aspects of precariousness of platform work.19 In particular,
technology both enables greater surveillance of workers, while also isolating them,
each of which entrenches precariousness in specific ways. The level of flexibility and
freedom offered for work available through digital platforms is often cited as a draw
for platform workers. However, “technology, in fact, acts more as an enabler of
management than an emancipator” in these contexts.20 For example, the extent to
which platform-based work enables surveillance and tracking activities, such as in
relation to acceptance rates, has been noted as a cause of distinct stress for platform
workers as compared with more traditional forms of employment or work.21 This
entrenches the precariousness of the work both through the minute tracking of worker
activities and through the consequential stress and negative impact on well-being to
workers.
Technology further functions in the context of platform work to create an
acutely isolated and autonomous labour pool. The nature of platform work is such that
16

Zwick, supra note 15 at 681–82.

17

Mark Freedland, “New Trade Union Strategies for New Forms of Employment - A Brief Analytical and
Normative Foreword” (2019) 10:3 European Labour LJ 179 at 181–82. See also Ian Fitzgerald, Jane Hardy
& Miguel Martinez Lucio, “The Internet, Employment and Polish Migrant Workers: Communication,
Activism and Competition in the New Oganisational Spaces” (2012) 27:2 New Technology, Work &
Employment 93, cited in Mexi, supra note 1 at 9.
18

Stanford, supra note 15.

19

See e.g. Prassl, supra note 5.

20

Nicola Countouris, Valerio De Stefano & Mark Freedland, “Preface to the ELLJ Special Issue: ‘Testing
the “Person Work” Relation: New Trade Union Strategies for New Forms of Employment” (2019) 10:3
European Labour LJ 175 at 176.
21
Uttam Bajwa et al, “The Health of Workers in the Global Gig Economy” (2018) 14:124 Globalization &
Health 1.
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the work takes place in unfixed locations, during inconsistent times, with little or no
physical workspace or opportunity to interact with other workers or with the company
they work for.22 While the independence and flexibility associated with these
characteristics of platform work is often cited as a benefit or advantage of this form of
work,23 the resulting social isolation can negatively impact a worker’s sense of wellbeing. Moreover, the extent of isolation and fragmentation of this workforce affects
access to important avenues through which they might mediate their working
relationship, interests and concerns. Without the opportunity for interaction with
similarly situated individuals (other workers), platform workers do not benefit from
clear or direct access points to seek advice on problems associated with their tasks or
working conditions, or to gather information about their legal rights and protections.24
Further, without clear communication channels to other workers, platform workers are
inhibited from collectivization and collaboration.25 This poses a unique challenge for
platform workers, as collective labour action has historically been seen as an important
tool through which workers can advance their interests.
Collective action, in particular, can provide platform workers, as it does with
other workers, an avenue through which they can work towards materially improving
their working conditions and interests. This may include items such as working hours,
wages, surveillance and tracking systems, expectations concerning acceptance rates,
health and safety conditions, and others. Importantly, collective action provides a
means through which to raise awareness of and directly bargain about such conditions,
potentially regardless of employment status, allowing platform workers to move past
the status debate in order to advance their labour interests directly. The next section
takes up a direct examination of forms of collective labour action that platform workers
have engaged in, with a view to understanding the promise and potential of collective
labour action in furthering the interests and needs of platform workers outside of the
confines of existing labour and employment law regimes.
II. Collective Action and Labour Organizing Among Platform Workers
Despite the noted difficulties and barriers that platform workers face, as discussed in
the previous section, a growing number of case studies illustrate the innovative
approaches workers are using to collectively organize and advance their labour

22

See e.g. Mexi, supra note 1 at 9.

23

See e.g. Elise Taylor, Isolated with Friends: Online Communities in the Gig Economy (Masters
Dissertation, Northeastern Illinois University, 2017) [unpublished] at 15.

24
Juliet Webster, “Microworkers of the Gig Economy: Separate and Precarious” (2016) 25:3 New Labor
Forum 56.
25
See e.g. Alex Wood, Vili Lehdonvirta & Mark Graham, “Workers of the Internet Unite? Online Freelancer
Organization Among Remote Gig Economy Workers in Six Asian and African Countries” (2018) 33:2 New
Technology, Work & Employment 95 at 97–98.
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interests outside of formal unionization,26 and the promise that such approaches may
hold in that regard. This section outlines and describes various approaches to collective
labour action that platform workers have used, and how these may provide effective
avenues through which to respond to the issues, needs and challenges they face. These
include informal collectivization through the creation and proliferation of
communication channels, union affiliation, union creation, cooperative ownership,
and localized legislative responses.
In its most informal instantiation, collective labour action by platform
workers has included the creation and use of communication channels as a means to
connect with other workers, as well as public protests as a vehicle through which to
convey a shared message to a broader audience. Public protests and demonstrations
can function as a platform for workers to advance their labour interests, and increase
the visibility of the workforce and the ongoing issues it faces. For example, numerous
large-scale protests by Indonesian app-based drivers during 2016-2017 resulted in
widespread media attention and invitation to talks with both legislators and
companies.27 Similarly, app-based couriers in Italy engaged in large-scale protests
against Foodora in an effort to improve the wage structure associated with their work.28
Workers have further organized strikes and boycotts in the delivery sector, such as
through “logging out en masse from apps that allocate work shifts”.29
Platform workers have also created and utilized communication channels as
a vehicle for internal discussion, dialogue and collaboration. These channels, also
called “mass self-communication networks”,30 provide workers with an important
avenue through which to connect with other workers, discuss dissatisfaction with their
employer and working conditions, and brainstorm solutions for the future.31
Communication channels can also be used to externally advocate for better conditions
directly with consumers. In the United States, “Turkopticon, an online community of
26
Access to which will be shaped directly by whether such workers are understood as employees or
independent contractors, and by the statutory language defining application of the relevant legislation, as
discussed in section I.
27
Michele Ford & Vivian Honan, “The Limits of Mutual Aid: Emerging Forms of Collectivity Among Appbased Transport Workers in Indonesia” (2019) 61:4 J Industrial Relations 528 at 541.
28
Arianna Tassinari & Vincenzo Maccarrone, “The Mobilization of Gig Economy Couriers in Italy: Some
Lessons for the Trade Union Movement” (2017) 23:3 Transfer 353.
29

Mexi, supra note 1 at 11, citing Anthony Forsyth, “'Prova di Solidarietà': How Effectively are Unions and
Emerging Collective Worker Representatives Responding to New Business Models in Australia and Italy?”
(Paper for the 17th International Conference in Commemoration of Prof Marco Biagi, Modena, 18-20 March
2019).
30
Alex Wood, “Networks of Injustice and Worker Mobilisation at Walmart” (2015) 46:4 Industrial Relations
J 259.
31
Ibid. See also Kurt Vandaele, “Will trade unions survive in the platform economy? Emerging patterns
of platform workers’ collective voice and representation in Europe” (2018) European Trade Union
Institute Working Paper No 2018/05; Mexi, supra note 1 at 11, citing Michele Forlivesi, “Alla ricerca
di tutele collettive per i lavoratori digitali: per i lavoratori digitali: organizzazione, rappresentanza,
contrattazione [Looking for Collective Protection for Digital Workers: Organization, Representation,
Bargaining]” (2018) 4:1 Labour & L Issues 35.
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Mechanical Turk platform digiworkers, created a web platform called “Dynamo” that
focuses specifically on building collective action”.32 Dynamo has engaged in a
sustained campaign involving the publication of guidelines on fair pay, for example.33
These forms of collective labour action can do some work to break down the
barriers associated with isolation and fragmentation of this workforce, as discussed in
the previous section. In particular, public protests and demonstrations function to
connect workers with a broader audience or set of stakeholders, making visible a
workforce that is largely rendered invisible through the discourse of consumerism that
dominates the public sphere. The increased visibility, itself, is said to be a benefit
regardless of whether such demonstrations effect material change in the short-term.34
Relatedly, the creation and use of communication channels amongst workers provides
the opportunity for interaction, problem-solving and advice-seeking in relation to their
working conditions. Of particular importance with regards to the “self-communication
networks”, these provide a means through which workers can “[boost] their
associational power” and undertake further or more formal labour organizing with a
view to advancing their labour interests.35
Building on the foundation that may be created through communication
networks and public demonstrations, platform workers in some cases have also
directly engaged with trade unions in order to advance their labour interests. In some
cases, workers are engaged with unions directly with the end-goal of formal
unionization in mind. Unions are providing legal support for platform workers
challenging their working conditions, employment status, and ability to formally
organize a union, through litigation. For example, in Canada, ongoing legal disputes
with Foodora and Uber are being supported by the Ontario Federation of Labour, as
well as Canadian Union of Postal Workers.36 However, beyond this core role, unions
are engaging with platform workers in a variety of informal ways. For example, in
some cases, workers are engaged in “union-affiliated” relationships where established
32
Mexi, supra note 1 at 11, citing Birgitta Bergvall-Kåreborn & Debra Howcroft, “Amazon Mechanical
Turk and the Commodification of Labour” (2014) 29:3 New Technology, Work & Employment 213.
33

Mexi, supra note 1 at 11, citing Niloufar Salehi et al, “We Are Dynamo: Overcoming Stalling and Friction
in Collective Action for Crowd Workers” (Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM Conference on Human
Factors in Computing Systems, Seoul, Republic of Korea, 18-23 April 2015), online (pdf): Stanford
University <hci.stanford.edu/publications/2015/dynamo/DynamoCHI2015.pdf>.

34

Riccardo Emilio Chesta, Lorenzo Zamponi & Carlotta Caciagli, “Labour Activism and Social Movement
Unionism in the Gig Economy. Food Delivery Workers Struggles in Italy” (2019) 12:3 Partecipazione e
Conflitto 819.
35
36

Vandaele, supra note 31 at 16.

See “Union Presidents Support Gig Workers’ Fight for Employee Rights”, Canadian HR Reporter (8
November 2019), online: <www.hrreporter.com/labour/news/union-presidents-support-gig-workers-fightfor-employee-rights/322363> [“Gig Workers’ Fight for Employee Rights”]; “Unionizing The Gig
Economy: Contractor Or Employee?” (7 November 2019), online: Fasken, The HR Space
<www.fasken.com/en/knowledge/2019/11/hr-space-unionizing-the-gig-economy-independent-contractoror-employee/> [“Unionizing the Gig Economy”]. As mentioned in the previous section, Foodora workers
have now been recognized as dependent contractors, enabling them to form a union under Ontario’s Labour
Relations Act: Foodora, supra note 4.
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unions are able to offer counselling and resources, as well as support for grassroots
organization among platform workers.37
In Europe, existing unions in several countries have made effort to adapt and
extend their member-base to include platform workers.38 These have included
inclusion of platform workers within existing collective agreements,39 partnerships
with platform workers,40 as well as supporting the creation of websites for workers to
“rate the working conditions of different platforms”, advocate for working conditions
and wages, and connect workers with existing unions.41 For example, in Denmark, a
first collective agreement on platform work was signed in 2018 between a platform
for cleaning services, Hilfr, and Danish trade union 3F.42 That agreement introduces a
new category of worker, “Super Hilfrs”, which attracts increased minimum hourly
wages and allows workers to accrue rights to pensions, holiday, and sick pay.43
Workers are eligible to become a “Super Hilfr” after 100 hours of work, and the regime
is opt-out, meaning that workers will automatically be included unless they
specifically object.44
Established unions, with existing expertise and resources, offer an important
support and avenue through which platform workers can collectively organize to
advance their labour interests through both formal and informal channels. Such
strategies are not new for unions, who have been increasingly present in similar ways
in a number of precarious industries and with various populations of precarious
workers. For example, a number of unions in Canada and internationally have been
engaged, both formally and informally, with migrant workers in agriculture and other
industries, supporting unionization as well as broader advocacy and support efforts for
these workers.45 As formal unionization has declined across a number of labour sectors
37
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in past decades, these kinds of activities by trade union organizations are being
documented and analyzed as a form of “union revitalisation” across a number of
jurisdictions.46
New unions and worker organizations are also being created across a variety
of jurisdictions specifically for platform workers. For example, in Austria, Foodora
workers created Betriebsrat with the support of an existing union, while in the United
States, both Seattle and California have App-Based Drivers Associations.47 New
guilds are further emerging in Europe, including “the Collectif Livreurs Autonomes
de Paris, the German Deliverunion, the Italian Deliverance Milano, and the Dutch
Riders Union with the aim to mobilize food couriers and Uber drivers, while also
seeking to establish collective bargaining and social dialogue in the platform
economy”.48 The creation of targeted associations and worker organizations can allow
platform workers to connect with other workers, and provide a basis for targeted and
concerted labour action, such as public awareness and advocacy campaigns, and direct
bargaining for working conditions, applicability of legislation, and other significant
topics.
Some platform worker collectives are taking steps to compete directly with
existing companies like Uber and Foodora through the creation of co-operative
ownership models. Worker-owned enterprises allow platform workers to “share risks
and benefits and negotiate better contracts, while being in a position to impact
decision-making on how the platform is organized and managed”.49 The extent of
control and direction that worker-owners may have under this model provides a clear
avenue for improving labour conditions and interests. ‘Worker-owned’ platforms have
surfaced in a variety of jurisdictions and contexts, including: Up & Go, a New York
City-based home cleaning app designed and owned by immigrant Latin American
workers; 50 Mensakas, a Barcelona-based delivery app started by two former Deliveroo
drivers; 51 Eva, a Montreal-based Uber-like app that provides drivers with voting rights
and shares in corporate profits;52 Fairmondo, a competition with Amazon and Ebay,
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46
Christian Lyhne Ibsen & Maite Tapia, “Trade Union Revitalisation: Where Are We Now? Where to
Next?” (2017) 59:2 J Industrial Relations 170.
47

Mexi, supra note 1 at 11–12.

48

Ibid at 12.

49

Ibid at 14 citing Trebor Scholz, “Platform Cooperativism vs. the Sharing Economy” (5 December 2014)
online:
Medium
<medium.com/@trebors/platform-cooperativism-vs-the-sharing-economy2ea737f1b5ad>; Simel Esim & Waltteri Katajamaki, “Rediscovering Worker Cooperatives in a Changing
World of Work” (2017) 1 IUSLabor 1.
50
Ryan Hayes, “Worker-Owned Apps Are Trying to Fix the Gig Economy’s Exploitation” (19 November
2019), online: Vice <www.vice.com/en_ca/article/pa75a8/worker-owned-apps-are-trying-to-fix-the-gigeconomys-exploitation>.
51

Ibid.

52

Ibid.

2020]

PLATFORM WORKERS AND COLLECTIVE LABOUR ACTION

51

which operates in Germany and the UK; 53 Fairbnb, an Airbnb alternative; 54 Green
Taxi Cooperative, a competitor with Uber in Denver; 55 and, Loconomics, an Amazon
Turk competitor in the US.56
These models, termed “platform cooperativism”,57 provide an approach
where workers’ rights may be better recognized and realized given the direct control
workers have over the enterprise, and which may work towards fostering more
sustainable and responsible commercialism.58 The worker-owned nature of such
enterprises may provide a promising response to the rise of the gig economy
monoliths,59 and importantly does so in a way that refocuses attention on the needs of
workers. This may, in turn, do some work to mitigate the tendency to pit consumer
interests against the needs of workers, a tactic commonly used to justify the suppressed
working conditions of platform workers. It may further mitigate the obfuscation issue
and its resulting consequences for workers, discussed in the previous section. Finally,
the cooperative model may facilitate a greater sense of solidarity among platform
workers.60
Finally, localized legislative responses that address the root issues at play
may provide concrete and material improvements for workers within that jurisdiction.
The municipality of Bolonga, Italy, recently passed a “Charter of fundamental digital
workers’ rights within an urban setting”.61 This Charter was the product of efforts by
Riders Union Bologna, a group of platform delivery workers who formed this union.
The Charter was signed by the city’s mayor, the Riders Union Bologna, two prominent
Italian labour unions, and two food delivery platforms that, combined, employ
approximately one third of food delivery riders in the city.62 The Charter prescribes a
fixed rate for services meeting or exceeding the applicable minimum wage, as well as
compensation for overtime, public holidays, bad weather, and insurance for accidents
and illness.63 At a broader level, both California and the European Union have engaged
in similar legislative responses, prescribing particular work conditions for platform
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workers regardless of their status.64 Formal regulatory responses, as the Bologna
example illustrates, are precipitated by collective action and advocacy that often
includes multiple stakeholder groups, and is integrally related to other forms of
mobilization and collective action discussed earlier in this section. In fact, the
development of new local or national regulation of such work may be seen as a distinct
output of the forms of collective action mentioned above, while also shaping further
forms of collective action through its resulting content.
Creative legislative approaches to addressing the labour needs, interests and
challenges of platform workers outside of the confines of existing labour and
employment law demonstrate the continued relevance and significance that extension
of legal rights and protections on paper may have, and how these can be effected in a
way that circumvents the lingering debate over employment status. Further, these
legislative responses appear to include similar conditions and terms to those of
negotiated collective agreements, such as the Danish example provided earlier in this
section. The Bologna Charter is particularly interesting given the highly localized
nature of the intervention, and potential for replication across municipalities in various
jurisdictions.
III. Platform Workers and Collective Labour Action: Lessons for the Modern
Economy
The previous section documented numerous examples of collective labour action by
platform workers grouped into the following general categories: communication
channels; union affiliation; union creation; platform cooperatives; and, legislative
responses. These forms of collective labour action contain important implications for
both platform workers and for workers in the modern economy more generally, which
is increasingly characterized by a shift away from traditional employment
relationships, and towards stratification and fissuring of the labour market.65 Most
directly, each of the forms outlined in the previous section illustrates ways in which
worker representation and voice can be advanced, and is being advanced, in a modern
economy where formal employers and formal unionization are both in apparent
decline. These forms demonstrate how collective labour action can advance core
interests and needs of and for workers regardless of enduring issues surrounding status,
which is posited to be of increasing concern for workers in a multitude of labour
sectors.66
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This section takes up an evaluation of the forms of collective labour action
discussed in the previous section, with a view to understanding how they may function
and be effective for both platform workers and other precarious workers in the modern
economy. As discussed earlier in this article, these forms of collective labour action
evidence innovative approaches to enduring labour law problems, both in overcoming
obstacles associated with employment status, and in overcoming obstacles associated
with practical access to rights regardless of status, as discussed in section I. As such,
the forms of collective labour action being undertaken in relation to platform work
have broader potential benefits for labour and the legal regulation of work in the
modern economy. This section first contextualizes the broader contemporary labour
landscape to which the benefits of the identified forms of collective labour action may
attach. It then goes on to evaluate and discuss the identified forms of collective labour
action from the previous section in relation to three key factors: representation of
members and power vis-à-vis external actors; channels of participation; and, service
alignment with member needs.67
The modern economy is informed by many shifting paradigms, including
globalization, automation, and the “fissured workplace”,68 which describes the
abandonment of historical “direct employment” relationships and trend towards
contracting-out discreet aspects of a business to external entities.69 This enables
enterprises to maximize profits by shedding legal responsibility for workers, who are
constructed as independent contractors, and also by transferring risk to those workers.
Just as the rise of the standard employment relationship in the mid-20th century was
motivated by the interests of capital-intensive enterprises, so too is the current shift
away from standard employment motivated by the interests of enterprise, though in
the opposite direction.70
The current labour landscape is increasingly characterized by “non-standard”
work.71 This label captures myriad forms of work that fall outside of the historical fulltime, permanent, direct-employment model. As such, “non-standard work” can
include part-time and seasonal workers, casual and contract workers, employees and
contractors. Alongside the growth in non-standard work is an increasing trend in the
precariousness of such work.72 Precarious work is variably defined in existing
scholarship, and often includes characteristics such as: instability and insecurity of
employment; low wages; lack of benefits and entitlements; and, lack of control or
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autonomy in the labour process.73 The consequences of precarious work often include
an erosion of effective rights and protections under law, and in practice in the
workplace.74 For a growing number of precarious workers, access to formal
unionization, which could assist in ameliorating these issues, is also increasingly out
of reach, either formally under law or in practice. This has, in turn, contributed to a
general decline in unionization in the modern economy.75
The increasing challenges of accessing formal and traditional models of
unionization has resulted in a shift towards “embrac[ing] alternative forms of voice as
a way to reach a broader set of worker identities and interests”76 pursued through
informal agreements and extra-legal mechanisms with employers and related actors.77
As existing scholarship has noted, access to formal unionization is increasingly out of
reach for a growing number of workers, including platform workers.78 Thus,
alternative forms of collective labour action, like those discussed in the previous
section, “typically focus on service, advocacy, or organizing to improve the working
and living conditions for employees rather than winning bargaining rights through
bargaining unit elections”.79
The previous section briefly commented on how each identified form of
collective labour action works towards advancing platform workers’ labour interests.
This section builds on those comments to examine in greater depth the function and
effectiveness of each form of collective labour action, not only for platform workers,
but more generally, given the noted shifts in the labour market within the modern
economy. Specifically, this section develops and discusses the potential benefits of the
identified forms of collective labour action in relation to three key criteria:
representation of members and power vis-à-vis external actors; channels for
participation; and, service alignment with member needs, drawing on the framework
developed by Tapia et al.80

73
Leah Vosko, ed, Precarious Employment: Understanding Labour Market Insecurity in Canada
(Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2006). See also Stephanie Procyk, Wayne Lewchuk & John
Shields, eds, Precarious Employment: Causes, Consequences and Remedies (Halifax: Fernwood, 2017);
Arne L Kalleberg & Steven P Vallas, “Probing Precarious Work: Theory, Research and Politics” in Arne L
Kalleberg & Steven P Vallas, eds, Precarious Work (Bingley: Emerald, 2018) 1.
74
Hastie, “Precarious Workplaces”, supra note 14; Weil, supra note 65 at 4; Davidov, “Characterization of
Workers”, supra note 14.
75
Tapia et al, supra note 67; Tapia & Ibsen, supra note 46; Hyman & Gumbrell-McCormick, supra note
45.
76

Tapia et al, supra note 67 at 1.

77

Ibid.

78

Tapia & Ibsen, supra note 46; Hyman & Gumbrell-McCormick, supra note 45.

79

Tapia et al, supra note 67 at 2, citing Annette Bernhardt & Paul Osterman, “Organizing for Good Jobs:
Recent Developments and New Challenges” (2017) 44:1 Work & Occupations 89.
80

Tapia et al, supra note 67.

2020]

PLATFORM WORKERS AND COLLECTIVE LABOUR ACTION

55

Tapia et al describe how scholarly inquiry has focused disparately on union
revitalization or alternative worker representation forms, without sufficient attention
to the overarching logics and considerations that explain why certain forms of worker
representation exist and how they are situated within the economic and labour market
landscape. The framework they develop moves forward from the siloed treatment of
alternative representation forms to provide a “common framework with testable
propositions about how incongruences are likely to lead to union restructuring or
alternative forms of worker representation via the logic of membership and
influence.”81 These logics, explained below, provide key indicators that can be used to
assess the function and effectiveness of forms of collective labour action for workers
in the modern economy.
The logic of influence focuses attention on how powerful an intermediary
organization or representation model is in its relationship with relevant external actors,
such as an employer. In other words, it suggests that effective representation requires
an intermediary, such as a union, that is “able to both represent and control workers
credibly and effectively vis-à-vis external actors, such as employers and the
government.”82 This logic examines the channels of representation, and mode and
extent of control over workers, in order to determine the level of influence the
intermediary has in relation to relevant external actors. This logic further examines
these two factors in relation to the external environment in which the intermediary is
operating. The “environment” is “a broad contextual factor that consists of the main
elements outside the direct control” of the intermediary, such as “labor laws, political
pressure, industry/organizational structures, and employer behavior”.83 Increasing
congruency between representation and the environment, and control and the
environment, work to increase the influence of the intermediary.84
The logic of membership focuses attention on the internal dynamic between
the intermediary organization or model and the workers or “membership base”. Under
this logic, congruence between member identities and the factors of services and
participation are key. The factor of services examines what “goods” the intermediary
is able to provide to the membership base, such as collective agreements, legal advice
or insurance, and how provided goods serve the interests of the constituency, having
regard to their identities. “Greater congruence is achieved when services maximize the
interest of the constituency”.85 Relatedly, channels of participation examines how the
internal structure of the intermediary reflects the constituency’s identities and
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interests. Greater congruence here is achieved when “channels of participation
maximize members’ feeling of empowerment”.86
As with a growing number of works across disparate industries and
occupations, platform workers face significant difficulty accessing traditional models
of collective labour action unionization. The previous section discussed many other,
and novel, strategies that are being employed in the context of platform work in order
to facilitate collective labour action, including: the creation and proliferation of
communication channels; union affiliation; union creation; cooperative ownership;
and, localized legislative responses. Each of these forms of collective labour action are
differently situated along the axes of the two logics described above: influence, and
membership. The remainder of this section examines how these forms of collective
labour action map onto these axes, having regard to the key factors of: representation
and control (for the logic of influence), and services and participation (for the logic of
membership).
Representation as a criterion for evaluating new forms of collective labour
action has particular import in the digital platform work context, and perhaps more
broadly in articulating and explaining why an increasing number of workers find
formal unionization inaccessible and inapplicable. The formal and narrow
requirements attending legal regimes for formal unionization often operate to the
practical (if not formal) exclusion of non-standard workers, geographically dispersed
workers, and autonomous workers. Platform workers can be described as
encompassing all of these characteristics (non-standard, geographically dispersed,
autonomous/isolated work). Moreover, the increasing population of precarious
workers may be variably characterized by one or more of these factors, particularly as
concerns non-standard work. This makes representation of particular importance in
considering and evaluating forms of collective labour action. The forms of collective
labour action discussed in section II create channels of representation that do not
depend on classification or status under employment law, a noted inhibitor to
accessing formal unionization under existing labour law, and thus work towards
greater congruency between representation and the environment in the context of
platform work, and potentially for other precarious work contexts.
The creation of new unions specifically for platform workers, particularly in
jurisdictions that allow for more flexible models of unionization, such as in Europe,
may be seen as promising avenues for increasing channels of representation and
increasing the congruence between representation and the environment. This form of
collective labour action, closely aligned to the dominant historical model of formal
unionization, shows the potential for adapting existing labour law regimes in ways that
ameliorate the limitations and constraints noted in respect of these channels of
representation for platform workers and an increasing number of precarious workers
more generally.87 Further, the bargaining power that this form of collective labour
action may hold, as evidenced by the instrumental role of the Riders Union in creating
86
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the Bologna Charter, for example, illustrates well the significance that congruence
between representation and the environment can have in enabling influence vis-à-vis
external actors and in effecting substantive change for worker-members.
Beyond the adaptation or expansion of unions, co-operative ownership may
best illustrate an alternative form of collective labour action that creates strong
congruence between representation and the environment. Co-operative ownership
models that enable broad-based participation by platform workers within the defined
geographic area and labour market sector provide an interesting pathway forward in
considering innovative solutions to an increasingly acute and potentially widespread
problem. In addition, the relatively low cost of entry for these enterprises, facilitated
in many ways by the technology that in other circumstances may function coercively,
makes co-operative ownership models a viable option for platform workers uniquely
as compared to other populations of workers. Further, given the direct-ownership
model of co-ops, congruence between control and the environment may be more
readily achieved, at least where this is mediated by a small number of worker-owners
in a geographically defined space. More broadly, as a model for collective labour
action, co-operative ownership may function vis-à-vis external governmental actors,
and can work towards advancing labour interests for platform workers in the arena of
law and policy. The extent to which co-operative ownership holds promise for broader
populations of precarious workers, however, may remain uncertain. The low cost of
entry to the market associated with online platforms is a significant advantage of this
model in the context of platform work. However, as noted earlier, some enduring
forms of precarious work, such as cleaning and domestic services, may transition to
online platform models, creating options for worker-owned co-operative enterprises
to transform such labour sectors.
Public-facing communication channels, such as protests, boycotts and public
awareness campaigns, may operate in weak ways to support channels of representation
and create influence vis-à-vis external actors, particularly those outside of the
historical employment relationship. These forms of collective labour action do some
work to make visible the hidden and often obscured centrality of the worker and their
labour in the platform economy. As such, these forms of collective labour action may
assist workers in advancing their interests and effecting change through direct
communication with external stakeholders, such as the consumer, enterprise, and
regulatory actors. These channels can, in addition to identifying and communicating
the interests to be advanced, further open channels for representation, as there are few,
if any, barriers to inclusion and participation for workers. These communication
channels are, however, informal and as such, the contributions provide a foundation
to support representation and influence, and should largely be seen as supportive or
secondary measures. This form of collective labour action is not unique to platform
workers, and the previous section discussed ways in which union-affiliated activities,
particularly, have engaged in similar public-facing communication channels and
campaigns for agricultural workers, as an example, which is another population of
precarious workers often rendered invisible and hidden. Such communication
channels, again, can be important supportive measures for advocacy around workers’
rights, particularly where workers’ interests require ‘buy-in’ from external
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stakeholders outside of the direct-employment relationship, such as from consumers
and regulatory actors.
Several forms of collective labour action discussed in the previous section
illustrate well the ways in which service alignment and member participation
positively influence internal dynamics, providing significant benefit or meaning for
worker-members, separately from a consideration of influence vis-à-vis external
actors. Services—what a form of collective labour action offers for its constituency or
member base—is expanded in important ways for platform workers in the forms of
collective labour action discussed in section II. Further, several of the identified forms
of collective labour action discussed in the previous section provide meaningful
channels for member participation. These attributes align with recent labour studies
literature that examines how collective labour action, both including and beyond
unionization, can hold benefits for workers beyond formal bargaining power and the
negotiation of working conditions under a collective agreement.88
Services in the form of resources and information can be an important tool
for platform and other precarious workers who may lack clarity on their existing legal
rights and status. Further, as discussed in section II, resources and information-sharing
amongst workers, as facilitated through some forms of collective labour action, can
assist workers in identifying common challenges and trends in their working
relationships. This can both create a sense of community and belonging in its own
right, combatting effects of social and geographic isolation inherent in platform work,
and can also be used to form a foundation for further collective labour action that looks
to influence external actors, such as the enterprise ‘employer’, government, or the
general public, as discussed above. Various forms of collective action described earlier
provide information and resource-sharing services, which may align with basic
informational needs of workers, as well as providing a secondary benefit of
networking and connection amongst workers, thus combating isolation and mitigating
against the noted barriers to collective organizing amongst geographically dispersed
and autonomous workforces. These benefits are readily extendable beyond platform
workers. Similar channels for workers in various precarious and non-standard labour
contexts may work to both enhance a sense of well-being and community, while also
providing important information and resources on topics of interest, such as legal
rights and entitlements.
The union affiliation form of collective labour action discussed in section II,
while not unique to engagement with platform workers, illustrates well how the trade
union—as the historically dominant labour relations form—is further adapting its
function and purpose to create better congruence between its membership and services.
Beyond formally representing union members, engagement in broader advocacy and
resource provision to non-union sectors and workers such as platform workers, and
agricultural workers, can both assist a union in building a potential membership base
for formal representation, and also reimagines the purpose of the trade union as
advancing worker voice and interests more broadly. Like with the creation of unions
88
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for platform workers, this is a modest shift in form of collective labour action from the
historical dominant model of formal unionization. Yet, it similarly evidences the
potential of this existing core to adapt to a modern economy, including re-envisioning
its function and purpose to advocate for decent work on behalf of all workers, and
perhaps especially the growing number of precarious workers for whom formal
representation under a trade union is inaccessible, as discussed earlier.
In addition to service provision, evaluating forms of collective labour action
asks about the internal dynamic fostered through participation of members. This
criterion is clearly exemplified in many of the identified forms of collective labour
action taken up by platform workers, as discussed in section II. Channels of
participation should aim to “maximize members’ feeling of empowerment” and,
possibly, sense of belonging within the collective.89 Given the fragmentation,
geographical dispersion, and autonomous nature of platform work, as with many other
forms of precarious labour, channels for member participation may be a particularly
significant benefit of alternative forms of collective labour action. As discussed above,
some of the identified forms, while focused on service provision, provide additional
opportunity for member participation through networking as well as grassroots
information sharing. This may foster a sense of empowerment and belonging, as well
as a sense of community, amongst workers who are otherwise largely isolated.
New union creation and co-operative ownership models, while creating more
open channels of representation, are also grounded by worker participation at their
core, enhancing the sense of empowerment and ownership workers will perceive, and
hold, over their labour, as well as in relation to collective advocacy or bargaining
efforts. Indeed, these forms of collective labour action may hold particular promise for
addressing noted gaps for precarious workers in the modern economy given the extent
to which they increase congruence between representation and environment, on the
one hand, and between membership and participation on the other hand. However, as
mentioned earlier, new union creation will be a viable option particularly in
jurisdictions that enable flexible unionization models under law, notably in Europe.
This makes this form of collective labour action weaker in jurisdictions like Canada,
where difficulties in opening up the channels for representation under current law
would remain. However, as discussed earlier, associational models outside of formal
unionization may still hold relative influence in advocating and advancing the labour
interests of workers to a broader set of stakeholders, such as consumers and regulatory
actors. Relatedly, the promise of co-operative ownership models is constrained by the
higher cost of entry to the market outside of online platform-based work, as discussed
earlier. Nonetheless, where a sector of precarious labour may find ways to transition
to platform-based work, such as with respect to a few examples concerning cleaning
and domestic services set out earlier in this article, such a model may prove a viable
form of collective labour action for workers.
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Conclusion
Digital platform work has captured much attention from legal and other scholars,
policy makers, and others, in recent years. While this form of labour presents distinct
challenges for regulation in the modern economy, it also reveals enduring challenges
of and for labour law. Particularly, while distinct in some ways, platform work in many
other ways mirrors and aligns with noted historical trends in relation to broader
conceptions of precarious work that exist across a range of labour sectors and
occupations. Much of the dialogue surrounding platform work to date has focused on
resolving the question of employment status. However, as this article demonstrated,
this focus has distracted attention from the deeper underlying questions about the
function and effectiveness of labour and employment law more broadly and, again, for
both platform workers and a wider population of precarious workers.
The technology associated with platform work, coupled with the heightened
attention on this form of precarious labour, has in some ways produced novel
approaches to advancing labour interests for workers outside of the confines of
existing labour and employment law regimes and taxonomies. These forms of
collective labour action, as identified in this article, present interesting case studies
from which to consider how alternative forms of collective labour action may hold
some promise for labour, and its legal regulation, in a modern economy that is
increasingly characterized by non-standard work and workers that fall outside of
historical regulatory regimes. This article canvassed various forms of collective labour
action identified in relation to platform workers, and commented on the various
benefits and limitations associated with each form, having regard to the ways in which
these forms open channels of representation, hold influence vis-à-vis external actors,
create service alignment with member needs, and open channels for participation by
members. As stated at the outset, the aim of this article is to provide a rich descriptive
foundation of the identified forms of collective labour action, their benefits and
limitations, in order to set the stage for further dialogue and examination of the future
of labour (law) in the modern economy.

